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In his John Locke lectures delivered at the University of Oxford and 
published as a book Our Knowledge of the Internal World (2008), Robert 
Stalnaker characterizes the difference between two opposing 
philosophical perspectives: the externalist and the internalist one in 
terms of their starting points. For an internalist, it is mental contents 
accessible through introspection that are the foundation of knowledge. 
The philosophical question an internalist asks is how can our knowledge 
reach beyond the contents of our mental states? For an externalist, it is the 
external world with the objects, properties, and relations within it that 
are the starting point. Among these objects there are creatures who have 
thoughts and experiences. The question is: how can these objects – human 
beings – have thoughts, which are about the world and about themselves? 
Stalnaker argues that puzzles concerning knowledge about our 
experience originate in the conflation of the two perspectives. As a 
remedy, he proposes a more thorough form of externalism. Externalism 
conceived in such a way consists in not only the claim that the contents 
of our mental states are determined by external facts (including both 
natural facts and the social environment), but also in the claim that 
contents are essentially ascribed. This type of externalism is linked to 
contextualism: contents are always ascribed in a particular context and 
there is no single correct characterization of our mental state, 
independent of the context of ascription. Stalnaker argues that providing 
a solution to some philosophical problems, problems of intentionality 
and of knowledge included, requires a shift from the perspective of a 
subject to the perspective of a theorist.  
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The main problem that the book addresses concerns our 
epistemic relation to our experience and the relation between 
experience and knowledge. Discussing Frank Jackson’s knowledge 
argument and a solution to the puzzle it describes, Stalnaker argues that, 
contrary to what the empiricist tradition takes for granted, our 
knowledge about our experience is no more direct than our knowledge 
about external objects. Stalnaker’s solution to the knowledge argument 
is based on the analogy between phenomenal and self-locating 
knowledge. Both are accessible only from a particular perspective. The 
most complex parts of the argument presented in the book concern the 
relation between the knowledge we can have only from a certain 
perspective and the objective knowledge.  
The knowledge argument and the three strategies 
Stalnaker starts with a discussion of the knowledge argument and three 
different strategies to avoid its conclusion. 
The knowledge argument is based on two premises: (1) Mary 
knows all the facts of the type F. (2) Mary doesn’t know the fact that p. 
From the two premises it follows that (3) The fact that p is not of the type 
F. The argument leads to the conclusion that beyond physical facts (or 
communicable facts) there exist facts of a different kind, phenomenal 
facts. Stalnaker discusses three strategies to resist the argument. The 
Fregean strategy adopts a more fine-grained notion of information than 
that of discriminating possibilities. David Lewis claims that what Mary 
acquires is not new information, but a new ability. John Perry’s solution 
draws on an analogy between phenomenal and self-locating knowledge. 
All three strategies attempt to rebut the argument by ruling out the 
possibility that what Mary lacks is certain information, understood in 
terms of distinguishing between possibilities. It is this possibility that 
Stalnaker urges us to recognize. 
i. The Fregean strategy 
A proponent of the Fregean solution claims that Mary does not learn a 
new fact, but she learns the same fact in a new way. The solution requires 
modes of presentation or senses which individuate thoughts in a more 
fine-grained way than in terms of their truth conditions. Before leaving 
the black and white room, Mary has knowledge about certain mental 
state under a functional or neurophysiological mode of presentation. As 
a result, she knows the same fact under a visual mode of presentation. 
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Stalnaker rejects this solution, because, all in all, it does not avoid the 
conclusion that Mary’s lack of knowledge stems from her inability to 
eliminate possibilities, and at the same time it does not provide a good 
account of these possibilities. The argument takes the following form: if 
materialism is true, both of these concepts (modes of presentations) 
necessarily pick out the same object. We might have both concepts and 
yet not know that they apply to the same object: no a priori reasoning 
leads from the one to the other. Hence, we might conceive of a situation 
in which a certain object is ɸ, without being ψ. We are forced to accept 
that the situation is epistemically possible, although it is not 
metaphysically possible. Stalnaker, however, rejects the idea that 
metaphysical possibilities are a proper subset of a broader class of 
possibilities, which include conceptual possibilities. His objection is that 
we have no conception of a merely conceptual possibility. Usually what 
is merely conceivable is defined in terms of what one may have a clear 
conception of. Stalnaker argues that we cannot have a clear conception 
of an impossibility. In cases of necessary a posteriori truths, one way of 
explaining modal illusions is to redescribe them: for example a situation 
where one thinks that water is not H2O can be redescribed as a situation 
where one thinks of a substance phenomenally alike water that it is not 
H2O. Phenomenal experiences do not – one might argue in Kripke’s line 
of thought – allow for such a redescription. Let’s suppose that having a 
red sensation is identical to a functional state F. Yet, I can think that it is 
not. The possibility that I conceive of – one would argue – cannot be 
adequately redescribed as a possibility that some experience, other than 
the sensation of red, is not a functional state F. It is because the 
phenomenal property (the property of being experienced as seeing red) 
is essential to seeing red. Stalnaker presents this view just to reject it. As 
the objection is a step in his argument against the Fregean solution, one 
might worry whether – since Stalnaker himself rejects this objection – he 
does not dismiss this strategy too fast. 
ii. The ability hipothesis 
Lewis (1988) rejected the assumption (2) that what Mary lacks is 
knowledge of a certain fact. What she acquires after leaving her room is 
a new ability, not knowledge. This ability is not of a cognitive kind. 
Cognitive abilities enable us to distinguish between possibilities. Lewis 
argues that neither Mary’s situation before her release nor afterwards 
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can be described in terms of an ability to distinguish between 
possibilities. Lewis argues that before having an experience one cannot 
represent different possibilities. Before her release, Mary could not 
represent what it is to see red or what it is to see green and hence – 
according to Lewis – these possibilities cannot be used to characterize 
her mental state. After her release she can only think that it is like that to 
see red and again she cannot distinguish between different possibilities. 
Stalnaker points out that post factum Mary can represent different 
possibilities that she could not represent before and that these 
possibilities can be used to characterize her past cognitive limitations. 
What is important is that possibilities play an external role in 
characterizing the thinker’s mental states: it is the theorist who uses 
them in order to ascribe mental contents. Stalnaker argues that the 
ability that Mary acquires is a cognitive ability. “While it may be right, as 
the ability hypothesis claims, that Mary does not necessarily acquire 
information merely by having color experience, it seems that she does 
acquire an ability to make distinctions between possibilities that she 
could not distinguish before, and a proper account of these abilities 
requires an account of the distinctions between the possibilities” 
(Stalnaker 2008:37). The quote is key to understanding Stalnaker’s view 
on the relation between the knowledge about our experience and the 
knowledge about the world. 
iii. The self-locating analogy 
John Perry’s strategy is, according to Stalnaker, the most promising one. 
It draws on the analogy between self-locating and phenomenal 
knowledge. The analogy suggests how to avoid the conclusion of the 
argument. While we might know all facts of type F and yet still lack some 
self-locating knowledge, very few philosophers would conclude that 
there are self-locating facts ‘over and above’ physical facts. 
Perry’s solution proposes that beliefs and utterances have more 
than one type of content: aside from subject-matter content, they also 
include reflexive contents (Perry, 2001). Subject-matter contents are 
conditions that the world has to satisfy for the belief or the utterance to 
be true. Reflexive contents are conditions not only on the world but also 
on the belief or the utterance itself. When John says “I am happy”, the 
subject matter content of his utterance is that John is happy. Its reflexive 
content is that the person having this thought token is happy. In some 
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situations, all we learn when acquiring a self-locating belief is a reflexive 
type of content. For example, I know that the meeting starts at noon. 
When suddenly I realize that the meeting starts now, all I learn is a 
reflexive content: that the time of this thought token is noon. What I learn 
does not commit me to the idea that there are some self-locating facts 
over and above physical facts. Perry adopts this strategy to solve the 
puzzle about Mary: what Mary learns upon her release is a belief with a 
different reflexive content. Before her release Mary knew (1) QR is what 
it is like to see red (QR being a functional concept of seeing red). What she 
learns upon her release is (2) thisRED is what it is like to see red (thisRED 
being a visual concept of seeing red). The two thoughts have the same 
subject matter content, but they differ in their reflexive content: “(1) is 
true iff the origin of Mary’s QR concept, the concept involved in (1), is the 
subjective character of the experience of seeing red”. (2), on the other 
hand, “is true iff the act of inner attention to which it is attached is of the 
subjective character of the experience of seeing red” (Perry 2001: 147-
148). 
While Stalnaker accepts the general intuition behind the notion of 
reflexive content and agrees that an adequate theory of beliefs requires 
an account of how we can represent the perspective from which we 
perceive the world, he criticizes the way Perry has introduced the notion. 
First, he argues that Perry confuses the means of a representation with 
its contents. While the distinction between subject matter and reflexive 
content applies to utterances, its application to beliefs is problematic 
(Stalnaker 2008:39-40). Utterances are different than beliefs in that we 
might individuate them also in terms of occurrences of certain patterns 
of sounds, not only in terms of their content. With regard to beliefs, we 
cannot individuate them in any other way than in terms of their content1, 
that is, in terms of the proposition they express. Thus, when we speak 
about different types of contents regarding beliefs, we must assume a 
vehicle of content: language of thoughts or inner symbols representing 
the content. Stalnaker insists that instead of distinguishing between 
different types of contents we should model all the relevant aspects of 
                                                          
1 We might of course individuate a thought by referring to it as Mary’s favorite thought. 
We may, however, still ask what is her favorite thought? In order to know whether 
Mary’s favorite thought is the same as John’s we need to know their contents. 
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content (including the thinker’s perspective) in terms of distinguishing 
between possibilities. 
It is worth noting that Stalnaker is generally critical with respect 
to theories which attempt to account for the intentional character of our 
thoughts by postulating concepts, mental files, and other inner vehicles 
of contents. His main charge is that these theories confuse intentional 
with non-intentional descriptions and they merely pretend to explain 
intentionality. For example, the mental file metaphor explains the 
difference between two beliefs with the same subject matter content, in 
terms of the difference in the mental files involved, which ‘store’ these 
contents. Stalnaker reminds us however that what these files supposedly 
consist of are not propositions, but certain physical objects, whose 
intentional properties still require explanation (Stalnaker 2008: 40). 
Stalnaker also points out that reflexive contents as such do not 
explain Jackson’s puzzle. He evokes Nida-Rümelin’s thought experiment 
to demonstrate that the analogy between what we learn when we 
acquire a self-locating belief and what we learn when we have a 
phenomenal experience is flawed. In Nida-Rümelin’s scenario, Mary’s 
cognitive achievement is divided into two steps (Nida-Rümelin, 1995). 
Upon her release, Mary is first transported to a room covered with a 
multi-colored abstract wallpaper. Mary experiences colors for the first 
time, but she cannot connect her sensations to the concepts she has had 
before. It is only at the second step that Mary learns which color is which. 
It is then that she acquires information which is analogous to a self-
locating belief. Thus, the analogy – Stalnaker concludes – cannot explain 
what she learns at the first step. 
Stalnaker discusses yet another – although in his own view 
apparent – difficulty with the analogy. Many philosophers would say that 
there is an asymmetry between the two types of knowledge: while the 
information one learns when he acquires a self-locating belief is a 
contingent one (what I learn from you saying “I am Smith”, can be 
redescribed as: “a person looking such-and-such is Smith”), the 
information one learns by having an experience is not contingent in that 
sense. In the first case, the argument goes, we are allowed to interpret 
the demonstrative reference descriptively, as a non-rigid designator. In 
the second case, “this is what it is like to see red”, doing so would amount 
to saying that in a different possible world some other experience would 
play the role of seeing red. Many philosophers reject such a possibility. 
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Stalnaker in his critique of direct knowledge aims to show that they are 
wrong. 
Stalnaker’s account of self-locating beliefs 
The analogy is helpful, according to Stalnaker, on the condition that we 
have an adequate theory of self-locating beliefs. The account Stalnaker 
proposes differs from Perry’s and Lewis’ (Lewis, 1979) in that he claims 
that we can explain the special nature of de se beliefs in terms of their 
content without introducing a special type of contents (reflexive 
contents) or without altogether modifying the notion of content (Lewis’ 
centered worlds). The solution rests on the assumption that a lack of a 
self-locating knowledge always amounts to ignorance with respect to 
which of the worlds is the actual one. For the solution to work, it must 
provide such a mode of a transworld identification of the thinker, which 
excludes the possibility of the thinker’s not knowing that the one who is 
thus identified is he himself. The mode of identification which satisfies 
this condition is by reference to one’s occurrent thought token (Stalnaker 
2008: 61). 
Let’s recall Lewis’ example with two gods (Lewis, 1979): one god 
lives on the highest mountain and throws manna, the other god lives on 
the coldest mountain and throws thunderbolts. The gods are omniscient 
in the sense that they have all propositional knowledge. What they don’t 
know is which one is which. According to the account proposed by 
Stalnaker, what each of the two gods doesn’t know is which of the two 
worlds is the actual one: the world in which a person having this thought 
is a god living on the highest mountain or the world, in which a person 
having this thought is a god living on the coldest mountain. Stalnaker 
calls his solution a haecceitistic one, claiming that the worlds thus 
distinguished are qualitatively indiscernible (Stalnaker 2008: 58-59). 
This may give rise to three concerns: (1) whether the identification by 
reference to an occurrent thought token is really immune to the error 
through misidentification (that is, whether it is such that the thinker 
cannot be unaware that it is him who is thus identified) (2) that the 
solution commits us to existence of possibilities accessible only from a 
first-person perspective; what is the relation between the self-locating 
knowledge and the objective knowledge? (3) are the differences between 
the two worlds really merely haecceitistic, and do we have good reasons 
to think that some possibilities do not differ qualitatively? 
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Essentially indexical information and the relation between it and 
the objective information 
Stalnaker emphasizes that our theory of beliefs requires a notion of 
informational content which can be separated from its relation with the 
thinker whose knowledge it represents. We may have complete objective 
knowledge about the world, yet lack some self-locating information. Is 
then the self-locating information something “over and above” the 
objective information? 
Not many philosophers are likely to draw this conclusion, unlike 
in the case of phenomenal knowledge. The analogy between the two 
kinds of knowledge is that in both cases the epistemic situation of the 
subject is represented by possibilities which can be distinguished only 
from a particular perspective. We need to explain the relation between 
the self-locating knowledge and the objective knowledge. 
A notion important to Stalnaker’s view is the notion of essentially 
indexical information. Essentially indexical information consists of 
“distinctions between the possibilities (the ways the world might be) 
that can be represented only from a certain perspective, but that once 
represented, can be abstracted from the perspective” (Stalnaker 
2008:78). We might explain the notion using one of the examples 
discussed by Stalnaker. Sleeping Beauty (the heroine of Adam Elga’s 
puzzle), before being put to sleep learns that she will be woken up once 
(on Monday) or twice (both on Monday and Tuesday) depending on the 
result of a coin toss (Elga, 2000).  
On Monday (and Tuesday, should she be awakened then), Sleeping Beauty 
was able to distinguish between a world in which, as she would put it then, 
today is Monday, and a different world in which today is Tuesday. On 
Sunday she was unable to distinguish between these two possible worlds, 
since in both of them an event of the same kind occurred on both Monday 
and Tuesday. To distinguish one from the other, one had to be there, or 
alternatively, to remember later having been there: one had to be in a 
position to refer uniquely to that particular time that Sleeping Beauty was 
awakened. But even on Sunday, Beauty was able to describe the distinction 
she was unable to make (Stalnaker 2008:78). 
The notion of essentially indexical information is best understood in the 
light of Stalnaker’s theory of communication. Communication always 
takes place in a context (which includes beliefs held by the participants 
in the conversation) and results in a change of context. The context is 
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best represented as a set of possibilities (possible worlds). While 
communicating, the participants change the context by adding new 
information i.e. by excluding some possibilities. Sometimes knowledge of 
the relation between the utterance and the context is important to 
determine what information is being communicated. It is, however, not 
itself part of that information. For example, when I tell my friends “I live 
in Warsaw”, they can extract the information from the context in which I 
communicated it. On the other hand, when I introduce myself by telling 
you my name, the information I thus convey cannot be extracted from 
the context of utterance, because “there is not a piece of information that 
is the content of what I told you that you can simply add to your stock of 
beliefs about the objective world”. As Stalnaker explains, “the point about 
essentially contextual information is that sometimes the content of what 
is expressed or believed in is not detachable from the context in which it 
is expressed or believed” (Stalnaker, 2008: 81). 
Whether one represents the thinker’s beliefs by means of locally-
distinguishable possibilities or by means of non-local possibilities 
depends on his (the theorist’s) goal. Stalnaker illustrates this kind of 
context-dependence of belief ascriptions with the following example 
(Stalnaker 2008: 83-84): imagine Rudolf Lingens, the famous amnesiac 
from the Stanford Library. His two colleagues Daniels and O’Leary, who 
don’t know his true identity, call him “Nathan”. One day they see a crowd 
of journalists gathering in front of the library. O’Leary asks his friend: “Do 
you know who it is?” pointing at a man surrounded by journalists. “Yes” 
– Daniels replies – “it is our famous amnesiac friend, Nathan”. In this 
context – as Stalnaker argues – we can represent Daniels’ beliefs 
straightforwardly as beliefs about Lingens: the possibilities he eliminates 
are those in which it is someone other than Lingens whom they see. On 
the other hand, if one of the journalists approaches Daniels and asks him 
“Do you know who it is?” pointing at Lingens, the theorist would like to 
emphasize Daniels’ ignorance with respect to his friend’s true identity 
and he would represent Daniels’ epistemic situation using locally-
distinguishable possibilities: the man who is there is X, Y, Z etc. What is 
local about this characterization of Daniels’ beliefs is that it is only 
relative to this context that we cannot describe Daniels’ beliefs in terms 
of Lingens himself and that the possibilities that we use to characterize 
his beliefs are distinguishable only within that particular context. 
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Distinguishing vs. eliminating possibilities, and possibilities 
accessible only from a first-person perspective 
Before I move on, I want to raise some concerns regarding the proposed 
account of self-locating knowledge. Key to Stalnaker’s theory of beliefs 
(including self-locating beliefs) are notions of distinguishing and 
eliminating possibilities. It is important not to confuse these two notions. 
To distinguish between possibilities is to be able to represent 
them (descriptively or by means of individuals), and it does not require 
one to know which possibility is the actual one. When I tossed a coin, 
before I check the result, I distinguish between two possibilities, 
although I cannot tell which one corresponds to the actual world. To 
eliminate possibilities, on the other hand, is to know which one of them 
is actual. The distinction between distinguishing and eliminating 
possibilities carries on to possibilities accessible only from the first-
person perspective. 
One problem related to Stalnaker’s theory of de se beliefs is that it 
commits us to the view that some possibilities are accessible only from 
the first-person perspective. Stalnaker’s solution consists in proposing a 
mode of identification of the thinker in terms of his occurrent thought 
token. This requires that we cannot have knowledge about particular 
thought-token other than from a first-person perspective. The claim 
doesn’t seem controversial, but if we assume the possibility that 
thoughts are token-identical with physical events, it is less obvious why 
we cannot in principle have singular thoughts about someone else’s 
thought tokens. If we could, we face again the possibility of error through 
misidentification: My belief “the person who is having this thought is X” 
does not imply a belief „I am X”. We either have to rule out that thoughts 
are token-identical with physical events or we need to claim that there is 
a class of physical events which are accessible only from the first person 
perspective. 
Second problem is how to reconcile the two claims that Stalnaker 
accepts: (1) a complete objective knowledge about the world requires the 
capacity to eliminate all possibilities which are inconsistent with the way 
the world actually is (i.e. one has to know the truth value of every 
proposition); (2) having a complete objective knowledge doesn’t require 
one to have the capacity to eliminate these subjective possibilities (i.e. 
there are some propositions whose truth value one doesn’t know). 
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One might answer that possibilities which we can represent only 
from the first-person perspective differ ontologically from other 
possibilities in that they are not real possibilities but mere 
representations of real possibilities. This, however, is at odds with 
Stalnaker’s conception of possible worlds (which are not representations 
but real possibilities for the world, i.e. ways the world might be). 
Possibilities that the thinker can distinguish only from the first-person 
perspective should also be understood as real possibilities. 
Second response one might offer is that possibilities which one 
cannot represent are irrelevant to one’s knowledge and hence cannot be 
used to characterize one’s epistemic situation. This is simply not true. 
The thinker need not have the ability to represent nor eliminate 
possibilities for these possibilities to be used in characterizing his beliefs. 
Suppose I am not aware of the existence of Plato. I cannot distinguish 
between nor eliminate the possibility in which Plato wrote The Republic 
and the possibility in which he didn’t. It doesn’t follow that this is 
irrelevant to my knowledge. To the contrary, we will characterize my 
ignorance in terms of these possibilities. 
Finally, one might point out that knowledge ascriptions are 
context-dependent. Not being able to eliminate some possibilities in 
most contexts does not preclude knowledge ascription. Thus, when we 
say “X has all the propositional knowledge, but doesn’t know whom he 
is” (as is the case of Lewis’ gods), we are restricting the quantifier. We 
are leaving aside these propositions which are accessible only from the 
first-person perspective. This answer allows us to reconcile the two 
claims at the cost of a commitment to possibilities that are accessible 
only from the first-person perspective. Moreover, we have to accept their 
existence as a primitive fact. 
The puzzle about Mary and the self-locating analogy 
How does the self-locating analogy help to solve the puzzle about Mary? 
In both cases – of not knowing who we are and of not knowing what it is 
like to experience something – the information one lacks is essentially 
indexical in the sense that it distinguishes between possibilities 
representable only from a local perspective. When we acquire a self-
locating belief, we eliminate possibilities that we could represent only 
from a local point of view. When we learn this is what it is like to see red, 
do we likewise come to eliminate possibilities? Stalnaker answers in 
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the negative: he claims that just by having a phenomenal experience one 
acquires a cognitive ability which enables one to represent possibilities 
but not to eliminate them. Stalnaker’s argument supporting this claim 
rests on the assumption that we don’t gain knowledge about its essential 
properties just by having a phenomenal experience. It is, however, not 
clear how that establishes that mere knowledge about our experience 
does not enable us to eliminate possibilities, since: (i) In some contexts 
it seems natural to say that just having the experience enables one to 
eliminate possibilities; (ii) Stalnaker rejects the view that the thinker 
must know the essential properties of an object to have singular beliefs 
about it. Thus, in both cases (phenomenal knowledge and knowledge 
about external objects) whether we ascribe knowledge i.e. the ability to 
eliminate possibilities depends on a context. Stalnaker’s claim must be 
weaker: just having the experience does not automatically, and in every 
context, amount to having the ability to eliminate possibilities. 
Stalnaker presents the following thought-experiment (Stalnaker 
2008:86) to support his claim that the experience itself does not enable 
us to eliminate possibilities: Mary is told before her release that she will 
be subjected to an experiment. Depending on a result of a coin toss she 
will be shown a red or green star. Before the experiment takes place Mary 
can represent two possibilities, none of which she can eliminate. After 
the experiment, in which she was in fact shown a red star, she still 
distinguishes between two possibilities, none of which she can eliminate. 
Mary thinks: I know how it is to see red or how it is to see green. I don’t 
know, which of the two colors I saw. What has changed about Mary’s 
epistemic situation, according to Stalnaker, is that after the experiment 
she is able to represent knowledge about her own experience that she 
couldn’t represent before. She is not, however, able to eliminate 
possibilities. The argument doesn’t seem to be conclusive: one might 
argue that in some contexts it is intuitive to say that the experience does 
enable her to eliminate possibilities (I discuss such an example below). 
The conception of knowledge about our experience should make sense 
of such cases. 
Lewis’ theory of knowledge and the principle of phenomenal 
indistinguishability 
Stalnaker provides an insightful critique of Lewis’ theory of knowledge. 
He blames the inconsistencies of Lewis’ view on him conflating the 
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externalist and internalist perspectives. On one hand, Lewis imposes 
very strong epistemic constraints on knowledge of objects, which makes 
him deny that we can have singular beliefs about them. On the other 
hand, he grants experience a role that it cannot play. That is because 
unless we accept the controversial claim that by merely having an 
experience we know its essential properties, our knowledge about our 
experience does not satisfy Lewis’ restrictive criteria. 
The principle of epistemic indistinguishability is the claim that 
worlds which are epistemically accessible to a thinker are phenomenally 
indistinguishable. Stalnaker defines the notion of phenomenal 
indistinguishability in terms of a cognitive capacity: two mental states 
are phenomenally indistinguishable iff the subject can switch from one 
to the other without noticing any difference. Stalnaker claims that the 
thought experiment with Mary and the two stars shows that the principle 
is false. After being presented with the red star, Mary still doesn’t know 
which one is the actual world: the one in which she was shown a red star, 
or the one in which she was shown a green star. The two worlds should 
be phenomenally indistinguishable for her, while in fact they are not. If 
they were, we would have to accept that there is a counterfactual world 
in which she saw a green star, which is phenomenally indistinguishable 
from the actual one in which she saw a red star. The principle of 
epistemic indistinguishability commits us – Stalnaker concludes – to the 
existence of phenomenal information (Stalnaker 2008: 90-91). 
We may, however, disagree with Stalnaker in that Mary doesn’t 
know whether she was shown a red or green star. She knows which star 
she was shown, she only doesn’t know the name of its color. If she was 
first shown a red star, and a moment later a green, yellow, and a blue one, 
and if she was asked which of the stars she saw first, she would be able 
to eliminate the possibilities. Stalnaker does indeed discuss a similar 
case: he claims that even when Mary names all the colors, but she cannot 
relate these names with the names she was using while locked in the 
black and white room, it is a matter of context whether we would ascribe 
to her knowledge that the object is red. In some situations of this type we 
tend to say that Mary knows that this tomato is red, and in another we 
don’t (when we want to emphasize the fact that she is unable to connect 
her old concepts to her new experiences). Stalnaker, however, thinks that 
the fact that in some contexts we would be reluctant to ascribe 
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knowledge is enough to undermine the principle of phenomenal 
indistinguishability. 
Stalnaker presents us with the following choice: either we stick to 
the principle of phenomenal indistinguishability at the cost of accepting 
that phenomenal information exists or we reject the principle and accept 
that knowledge about our experience is not epistemically privileged and 
does not play the role it was granted by empiricist epistemology. 
Stalnaker argues for the latter option: the knowledge about our 
experience is as indirect as knowledge about external objects. What he 
attempts to do, however, is to elucidate the notion of direct knowledge 
by explaining the intuitions that motivate it. 
Lewis imposes a very strong epistemic constraint on the 
knowledge of objects: singular thoughts about objects require 
knowledge of their essential properties. Since we don’t know essential 
properties of objects, Lewis claims that we cannot have singular thoughts 
about them. He uses Saul Kripke’s puzzle about Pierre to justify this claim 
(Lewis, 1981). Pierre, as we remember, thinks about London (when he is 
still in France and calls it “Londres”) that it is pretty and (when moving 
to London and using its English name) that it is not pretty. If we accept 
the theory of direct reference and the disquotational principle we are 
forced to ascribe to him contradictory beliefs. That violates our intuition 
that Pierre is rational. Lewis argues that the puzzle lends support to the 
internalist theory of beliefs. He argues that we might conceive of a 
situation in which the French name “Londres” designates a different city 
than London, Bristol for instance. Such a world is for Pierre 
indistinguishable from the actual one. Since Pierre doesn’t know 
London’s essential properties, there are such possible worlds 
epistemically accessible to him in which the name “Londres” refers to a 
different city than London. Whenever we have beliefs about objects 
whose essential properties we don’t know, there are epistemically 
accessible worlds in which some other object plays the same role as the 
given object plays in the actual world. 
An anti-individualist (an externalist) would object that the belief 
Pierre would have in that counterfactual world differs from the one he 
has in the actual world. Lewis rejects this counterargument claiming that 
we need a narrow notion of content in order to explain how we can have 
access to our own beliefs and to avoid the conclusion that Pierre is 
irrational. 
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Lewis claims that we cannot have a singular thought about an 
object without knowing its essential properties, and the same goes for 
our knowledge about phenomenal experience: we cannot have singular 
beliefs about our experience without knowing its essential nature. Lewis 
thus rejects the controversial claim that we know the essential 
properties of a phenomenal experience merely by having this 
experience. Accepting this controversial claim amounts to saying that by 
merely having an experience we would eliminate all possibilities in 
which my phenomenal experience has different physical nature. As 
Stalnaker points out, a materialist cannot accept this claim, as he holds 
that experiences are identical to physical states and that it is physical 
properties that are essential to them. We don’t know the physical nature 
of our experiences merely by having them. Having a phenomenal 
experience of a given type, for instance a headache, is not sufficient. I do 
not know whether my experience is a complex physical state of type A 
or B. 
Stalnaker points out that the privileged role that experience plays 
in Lewis’ theory of knowledge is at odds with his rejection of the claim 
that just by having an experience one knows its essential properties 
(Stalnaker 2008: 99). According to Lewis’ theory, knowledge is 
represented by possibilities which are not eliminated by experience 
(Lewis, 1996). A possible world w is not eliminated by experience iff the 
subject’s perceptual experience and memory in w are the same as they 
are in the actual world. Lewis gives a contextualist response to a skeptic’s 
concern “how then can we have knowledge which goes beyond our 
experience?”: depending on the context, we are allowed to ignore some 
possibilities which our experience does not eliminate. Let’s illustrate this 
idea with an example. John knows that it rains iff his experience 
eliminates every possibility in which it does not rain. We can, however, 
imagine that what John takes to be rain is an effect produced by a film 
crew. Although John’s experience does not eliminate this possibility, in a 
normal context (when it actually rains) this does not preclude us from 
ascribing knowledge to him. 
However, what is of key importance to Lewis’ theory is the 
assumption that we will know that the possibilities eliminated by 
experience, in any context, are inconsistent with our knowledge. This – 
Stalnaker argues – implies that by having an experience we gain 
knowledge about its essential properties and hence implies the above 
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mentioned thesis (that having an experience is knowing its essential 
properties), which Lewis in fact rejects. Accepting this controversial 
thesis, as Stalnaker reminds us, implies the phenomenal 
indistinguishability principle together with its correlate, the existence of 
phenomenal information. 
Stalnaker blames these inconsistencies in Lewis’ theory on him 
conflating the externalist and the internalist perspectives. The theory is 
externalist in that it describes the experience from an external 
perspective: as a set of possibilities in which the subject’s experiences 
are identical. It is, however, internalist in the privileged role of 
experience (Stalnaker 2008: 101). Lewis’ theory identifies knowledge 
with possibilities not eliminated by experience. As Stalnaker points out, 
according to Lewis’ theory, it is the mere occurrence of an experience 
that eliminates possibilities and not its propositional content. Worlds 
which are not eliminated by experience are worlds in which the subject 
has the same experiences as in the actual world. What the theory 
assumes is that two identical experiences have identical causes, hence 
there is a one-to-one relationship between phenomenal properties of our 
experience and the physical features of the world which cause this 
experience. 
Stalnaker is critical of these ideas. He thinks that Lewis 
misconceives the role of experience in eliminating possibilities by not 
recognizing that whether we’ll say that a certain experience eliminates 
possibilities or not depends on a context. Let’s think once again about 
Stalnaker’s thought experiment with Mary seeing a red or a green star. 
After being shown a red star, Mary is still not able to eliminate one of the 
two possibilities. But whether we’ll judge her to know which star she has 
seen (and ascribe her the ability to eliminate possibilities) depends on 
our, the theorist’s aims. Imagine two scenarios: in the first scenario we 
tell Mary that first she will be shown a red or a green star and later she 
will be presented with two buttons, a red and green one. If she presses 
the red button, the world will be annihilated. If she presses the green one, 
nothing will happen. In the second scenario, we tell her that later she will 
be presented with two buttons, a red and green one. If she presses the 
button of the color that she was exposed to during the experiment, the 
world will be annihilated. In the first case, we may say that the mere 
experience did not enable Mary to eliminate possibilities. In the second 
case, we will say that having the experience she has eliminated a 
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possibility. Thus, knowledge we ascribe on the basis of the experience 
depends on the context of ascription. 
Lewis’ contextualism is – according to Stalnaker – not thorough 
enough. Although Lewis thinks that in our everyday practice of belief 
ascription we are entitled to eliminate certain possibilities which seem 
irrelevant, we might still speak about knowledge in the absolute sense. 
Stalnaker disagrees with Lewis on this point. He also argues that it is not 
the mere occurrence of an experience which eliminates possibilities but 
their propositional content. As he points out, there is no direct 
connection between having an experience and the propositional content 
of our beliefs. 
The principle of epistemic transparency and anti-individualism 
Many theorist think, like Bertrand Russell, that having a singular belief 
about an object requires that the thinker is in a special epistemic relation 
with the object. Without our being acquainted with the object, the object 
cannot be the content of our beliefs. There is no single interpretation of 
what the relation of acquaintance amounts to. One possible 
interpretation of this notion was proposed by Lewis: in order to be 
acquainted with an object one has to know its essence (Lewis, 1981). 
Since we don’t know the essential properties of objects and persons, a 
proponent of this view has to deny that we have singular beliefs about 
them. The problem generalizes our knowledge of properties and 
relations. Stalnaker demonstrates that, contrary to the traditional view, 
we are not in such a privileged relation with our experience. 
The key idea to Stalnaker’s theory of belief ascriptions is his “deep 
contextualism”. It is the view that there is no one correct context-
independent characterization of the thinker’s beliefs. It is not the case 
that all context-dependent characterizations should be regarded as a 
mere approximation which could after all be substituted with correct 
context-independent characterizations (which we don’t do for practical 
reasons). Stalnaker claims that contents are essentially ascribed and not 
inherent. On this theory, having singular thoughts is not a matter of a 
thinker’s acquaintance with an object or his having a particularly rich 
conception of the object. Whether we characterize one’s beliefs in terms 
of the object singularly or descriptively depends on the context of the 
ascription. Stalnaker demonstrates that we might have a very detailed 
conception of an object and yet not be aware that this conception refers 
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to one and the same object. In order to characterize such a belief, we’ll 
need to do it descriptively. On the other hand, in a different context, one 
might know very little about an object beyond some contingent fact, and 
still we might be able to ascribe to him a singular belief about this object. 
It is the context of ascription that is critical to what we’ll judge as a 
correct characterization of someone’s beliefs. 
Deep contextualism also provides a way to accommodate a 
popular intuition that for our thoughts to explain the agents’ actions they 
must be epistemically accessible to them. Many authors have claimed 
(for example Paul Boghossian) that the intuition cannot be reconciled 
with anti-individualism, which holds that it is facts about the 
environment which determine the contents of our thoughts. Stalnaker 
thinks that an anti-individualist can make sense of the former intuition if 
he accepts the view that contents are externally ascribed by the theorist. 
The principle of transparency, which expresses the above 
mentioned intuition, says that for two thoughts of a subject to have the 
same content the thinker must know a priori that it is so (likewise if his 
two thoughts have different contents, the thinker must know that it is so) 
(Boghossian, 1994). The conflict between anti-individualism and the 
principle can be seen in the case of contradictory beliefs: situations in 
which we hold contradictory beliefs about an object, not realizing that 
our thoughts refer to one and the same object or situations in which we 
have beliefs about an object, not being aware that our beliefs refer to two 
different things. In these situations we cannot ascribe beliefs in a way 
prescribed by the anti-individualist theory or we would have to conclude 
that the subject is irrational. 
One type of arguments against anti-individualism makes use of 
the so called ‘slow-switching scenario’ (Boghossian, 1994). It is a thought 
experiment which involves a thinker being transported from one context 
to another (from Earth to Twin Earth) in such a way that he is not aware 
of the change and the two contexts are indistinguishable for him. The 
thinker’s beliefs on Earth are about water. When he thinks, shortly after 
being transported to Twin Earth, “There is water in this lake”, according 
to an anti-individualist, he has a false belief, which concerns water and 
not a true belief concerning XYZ. At the same time, we have a strong 
intuition that after years spent on Twin Earth, when having this type of 
thought, he no longer thinks about water, but about XYZ. He can also – to 
the detriment of our theories – compare his earlier beliefs with his recent 
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ones: while living for many years on Twin Earth he might recall: once 
(thinking of a specific episode from his Earthly life) water tasted much 
better than nowadays. 
Thought experiments of this kind demonstrate that our intuitions 
concerning the contents ascribed change with the situation. The 
challenge they are meant to pose for an anti-individualist is that he 
should account for the mysterious change that the subject undergoes 
which makes his thoughts change reference. Stalnaker rejects this way of 
putting the problem as deeply misleading (Stalnaker 2008: 121). Instead 
of situating the change in the subject (in his head), we ought to explain 
our intuition that the reference of his thoughts changes in terms of the 
context in which we make these belief ascriptions. Generally, we ascribe 
beliefs to explain and predict the agents’ behavior. It follows that we 
must ascribe beliefs in a way which is consistent with the assumption 
that the agent is a rational being. The principle of transparency reflects a 
different requirement: not on the subject, but on the theorist: the 
ascriptions that the latter makes cannot violate the subject’s rationality 
assumption. 
Stalnaker convincingly shows that the principle of epistemic 
transparency can be reconciled with externalism, understood however, I 
would argue, slightly differently than the early formulations of the view 
(Burge, 1979) suggest. Burge claimed about two thinkers, who (i) live in 
two linguistic communities that differ only in their use of the term 
“arthritis” and (ii) nevertheless associate the same set of descriptions 
with the term arthritis, that they do not have any common beliefs about 
the disease. Externalism, as it is interpreted by Stalnaker, does not 
exclude the possibility that in some particular context it might be 
perfectly fine to characterize their beliefs with the same sets of 
possibilities. Stalnaker’s externalism claims that (1) the content of our 
mental states depends on the facts concerning our environment in the 
sense that we should look for an explanation of why we have beliefs of 
that content in our causal relations with the environment. He also states 
that (2) contents are essentially ascribed and not inherent and that these 
ascriptions are made in a particular context which includes the cognitive 
aims of the theorist who does the ascription. The theory is also 
externalist in the sense that when making ascriptions we use the 
resources which are available to us: that is objects, properties, and 
relations which are there in the actual world. 
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Stalnaker’s book makes a strong case for externalism understood 
as a methodology rather than a metaphysical view. At the same time, he 
acknowledges important internalist intuitions (e.g. that we perceive the 
world from a certain point of view,) and shows that, by reversing the 
order of explanation, we can do justice to them on externalist grounds. 
Stalnaker shows that the possible worlds representation of content 
enables us to represent the subjective point of view of the thinker as well 
as the relation between his perspective and the way the world is in itself. 
The book is both very rewarding and very demanding. For, although 
Stalnaker avoids technical details, he connects variety of philosophical 
issues, often shifting the grounds of the discussion. 
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ABSTRACT 
KNOWLEDGE ABOUT OUR EXPERIENCE AND DISTINGUISHING 
BETWEEN POSSIBILITIES 
In my article I reconstruct the main threads of Robert Stalnaker’s book Our 
Knowledge of the Internal World, which focuses on the problem of our epistemic 
relation to our experience and the relation between experience and knowledge. 
First, the book proposes an interesting view of externalism, which combines 
classical externalist claims with a contextualist approach to content ascriptions. 
The approach accommodates some important internalist intuitions by showing 
how content ascriptions can be sensitive to the perspective from which a 
subject perceives the world. Second, Stalnaker proposes a theory of self-
locating and phenomenal knowledge, which should be understood in terms of 
differentiating between real possibilities. The puzzling upshot of this elegant 
solution is that  it commits one to the existence of possibilities accessible only 
from the first-person perspective. Finally, Stalnaker presents an argument 
which shows that our knowledge about our phenomenal experience is no more 
direct than the knowledge about external objects. Stalnaker’s claim that by 
merely having an experience we don’t learn any new information seems, 
however, too strict in light of his contextualist approach to content ascriptions. 
KEYWORDS: Robert Stalnaker; externalism; contextualism; phenomenal 
experience; self-locating beliefs 
 
